IP/07/1781 Brussels, 28 November 2007 　　　　　　　　　　欧州委員会板ガラスカルテルを調査

Antitrust: Commission fines flat glass producers Euro 486.9 million for price fixing cartel

The European Commission has imposed fines, totalling Euro 486 900 000 on Asahi, Guardian, Pilkington and Saint-Gobain for coordinating price increases and other commercial conditions for deliveries of flat glass in the EEA, in violation of the EC Treaty’s and the EEA Agreement’s ban on cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement). Flat glass is used for windows, glass doors and mirrors. Between early 2004 and early 2005, Asahi, Guardian, Pilkington and Saint-Gobain managed to raise or otherwise stabilise prices through a series of meetings and other illicit contacts. The case began on the Commission's own initiative. This is the second case in which the Commission has applied its new 2006 Guidelines (see IP/06/857 and MEMO/06/256) for the calculation of the fine (for the first case, see IP/07/1725).

Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said: "The Commission will not tolerate companies cheating consumers and business customers by fixing prices and depriving them of the benefits of the Single Market. Fortunately this cartel was discovered by the Commission with the help of the Member States' National Competition Authorities, in the context of the European Competition Network. This case demonstrates clearly the benefits of enhanced co-operation between the Commission and the National Competition Authorities ".

The Commission started this investigation on its own initiative on the basis of market information provided by several Member States' National Competition Authorities, showing excellent cooperation within the European Competition Network. Surprise inspections were carried out in February and March 2005 at the premises of Asahi's and Guardian's European subsidiaries, as well as at the premises of Pilkington, Saint-Gobain and the European Association of Flat Glass Producers. In between the two rounds of inspections, Asahi and its European subsidiary Glaverbel (recently renamed "AGC Flat Glass Europe") made an application under the 2002 Leniency Notice. They co-operated with the Commission and provided additional evidence.

The cartel

The cartel concerned flat glass for use in the construction sector, which includes basic float glass, low emissivity glass (i.e. glass coated with microscopically thin metal or metallic oxide layers to improve its insulating qualities), laminated glass and unprocessed mirror glass. In 2004 these undertakings' sales to independent customers in the EEA totalled Euro1 700 million. The main customers of flat glass for use in the construction sector are processors, which transform this glass into finished products, such as double-glazing windows, fire-resistant glass and mirrors, all of which are commonly used in large buildings but also in private houses and apartments.

Asahi, Guardian, Pilkington and Saint-Gobain, with a combined share of at least 80% of the flat glass market in the EEA, organised several rounds of price increases, fixed minimum prices and other commercial conditions in an endeavour to raise or otherwise stabilise prices. They also monitored the implementation of the price increase agreements.

The evidence uncovered describes in detail several meetings in restaurants and hotels in different European countries during which Asahi, Guardian, Pilkington and Saint-Gobain discussed and agreed the level and timing of price increases (including which undertaking was to lead the price increase), target prices, minimum prices and/or exchanged sensitive commercial information.

Fines

This is the second Commission antitrust decision applying the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (see IP/06/857 and MEMO/06/256). Under the new method, fines better reflect the overall economic significance of the infringement as well as the share of each company involved.

(*) Legal entities within the undertaking may be held jointly and severally liable for the whole or part of the fine imposed.

なお、日本板硝子は「ＥＵ独禁法関連引当金」として2007年3月期連結決算で 78,118百万円の引当金を計上している。
今回の同社の課徴金は約226億円だが、更に自動車用での課徴金の可能性がある。

Action for damages

Any person or firm affected by anti-competitive behaviour as described in this case may bring the matter before the courts of the Member States and seek damages, submitting elements of the published decision as evidence that the behaviour took place and was illegal. Even though the Commission has fined the companies concerned, damages may be awarded without these being reduced on account of the Commission fine. A Green Paper on private enforcement has been published (see IP/05/1634 and MEMO/05/489).

2007/12/5 　IP/07/1855

Antitrust: Commission fines producers of chloroprene rubber Euro 243.2 million for market sharing and price fixing in the EEA

The European Commission has imposed a total of ? 243 210 000 fines on the Bayer, Denka, DuPont, Dow, ENI and Tosoh groups for participating in a cartel for chloroprene rubber in the European Economic Area (EEA) in violation of the EC Treaty’s ban on cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 81). Between 1993 and 2002, these companies shared the market and fixed prices for chloroprene rubber, which is used for rubber components in a range of industrial products, as latex for the production of diving equipment, condoms and the inner soles of shoes and as adhesive.
The fine of ENI was increased by 60% as it had been fined previously for similar behaviour. The fine of Bayer would also have been increased for the same reason, but Bayer was the first company to come forward with information about the cartel under the Commission's 2002 Leniency Notice and received full immunity from fines.

Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said: “It is particularly disappointing that the rubber industry has still not learned its lessons about avoiding cartels. I find it very difficult to understand how shareholders and board members can tolerate such illegal behaviour"

Chloroprene rubber is a synthetic rubber capable of elastic deformation under stress and returning to its previous size without permanent deformation. It is mainly used in the rubber industry for the production of hoses, v-belts and power transmission belts, as adhesive in the shoe and furniture industry as well as latex for the production of diving equipment, condoms and the inner soles of shoes.

The Commission investigation started with surprise inspections in March and July 2003, prompted by an application for immunity lodged by Bayer under the 2002 Leniency Notice (see IP/02/247 and MEMO/02/23).

The cartel
From at least 1993 to 2002, the producers of chloroprene rubber operated a cartel in which they agreed each other's market shares and set prices. The companies held regular meetings to discuss prices, exchange sensitive commercial information, discuss specific clients and to follow-up the implementation of their illegal agreements.

Fines
These practices constitute very serious infringements of EC Treaty antitrust rules. In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the respective affected sales of the companies involved as well as the combined market share, the geographical scope and the actual implementation of the cartel agreements. The Commission increased the fines for ENI and Bayer by 60% and 50% respectively because they had already been fined several times for cartel activities in previous Commission decisions.

The cooperation of three groups under the Commission's leniency programme was rewarded. Bayer (although a repeat offender) was granted full immunity and Tosoh and DuPont/Dow were granted a reduction of their fines of 50% and 25% respectively.

The fines in this case are based on the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (see IP/06/857 and MEMO/06/256), in force at the time the Statement of Objections was notified.

The fines imposed and the leniency reductions granted by the Commission in this case are as follows:（単位：千ユーロ）

(*) Legal entities within the undertaking may be held jointly and severally liable for the whole or part of the fine imposed.

Action for damages
Any person or firm affected by anti-competitive behaviour as described in this case may bring the matter before the courts of the Member States and seek damages, submitting elements of the published decision as evidence that the behaviour took place and was illegal. Even though the Commission has fined the companies concerned, damages may be awarded without these being reduced on account of the Commission fine. A Green Paper on private enforcement has been published (see IP/05/1634 and MEMO/05/489).

東ソー 「本件に関しての今後の対応につきましては、 本決定通知の内容を精査し、弁護士とも協議の上、適切な対応 をとる所存です。」

電気化学 「今後その内容を精査した上で公正かつ適切に対 処してまいりますが、欧州第一審裁判所へ提訴することも含め 、慎重に対応する所存です。」

2008/7/1　日本経済新聞夕刊

カルテル摘発　EU「示談制度」導入
　関与認めれば制裁金減額　法的手続きの簡素化狙う

　欧州連合(EU)の欧州委員会は３０日、企業の価格カルテルに絡んで新たに「示談制度」の導入を決めた。カルテル制裁の手続きに入る前に対象企業が関与を認めた場合、制裁金の１０%を減額する仕組み。EUは巨額制裁金でカルテルの抑止を狙うが、違反企業による提訴が急速に増えており、示談制度で法的手続きの簡素化や訴訟の負担軽減を進める。

2008/6/30 EU　 IP/08/1056

Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels

The European Commission has introduced a settlement procedure for cartels which will allow the Commission to settle cartel cases through a simplified procedure. Under this procedure, parties, having seen the evidence in the Commission file, choose to acknowledge their involvement in the cartel and their liability for it. In return for this acknowledgement, the Commission can reduce the fine imposed on the parties by 10%. Settlements aim to simplify the administrative proceedings and could reduce litigation before the European Courts in cartel cases. This will in turn free Commission resources to pursue other cases. The Commission has analysed the 51 contributions received during the public consultation launched on 26^th October 2007 and has revised the package in consultation with the Member States' competition authorities. The legislative package consists of a Commission Regulation together with a Commission Notice (the "settlement notice") explaining the new system in detail. The settlements package will enter into force on the day of its publication in the EU Official Journal.

Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes commented: "This new settlements procedure will reinforce deterrence by helping the Commission deal more quickly with cartel cases, freeing up resources to open new investigations. Companies which are convinced that the Commission can prove their involvement in a cartel, will also benefit from quicker decisions and a fine reduction.”

The Commission's ability to fight cartels hinges on the evidence gathered during its investigations. Parties found guilty of a cartel often do not go to court to contest the existence of a cartel or their involvement in it, but rather to reduce or avoid fines. This is particularly so in cases driven by leniency applications.

Under the new settlement procedure, the Commission neither negotiates nor bargains the use of evidence or the appropriate sanction, but can reward the parties’ cooperation to attain procedural economies. Such cooperation is different from the voluntary production of evidence to trigger or advance the Commission's investigation, which is already covered by the Leniency Notice. Where both the settlement reduction and the leniency reduction are applicable, they are applied cumulatively. A decision finding an infringement of the antitrust rules and imposing fines pursuant to Regulation (EC) Nº 1/2003 is adopted, irrespective of whether the standard or the settlement procedure applies.

Parties have neither the right nor the duty to settle, but in cases where companies are convinced that the Commission could prove their involvement in a cartel, a settlement can be reached with the Commission on the scope and duration of the cartel, and the individual liability of the companies involved. To this end, parties will be informed about the envisaged objections and the evidence supporting them, and will be given the occasion to state their views, before formal objections are sent. If the parties chose to introduce a settlement submission, acknowledging the objections, the Commission's statement of objections (SO) would endorse the contents of the parties' submission and so could be much shorter than an SO issued without prior cooperation. Since parties will have been heard in anticipation of the "settlement" SO, other procedural steps can be simplified so that, following confirmation by the parties, the Commission can proceed swiftly to adopt a final decision after consulting Member States in the framework of the Advisory Committee, comprised of representatives of all Member States' competition authorities.

The Commission retains the possibility, until the final decision, to revert to the standard procedure. In addition, if no settlement was explored or reached, the standard procedure would apply by default.

The amendments to Commission Regulation (EC) nº 773/2004 on procedures for applying Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty accommodate the settlement option within the existing framework. Changes include:

• The introduction of "settlement" variants in provisions including the initiation of proceedings, access to file and oral hearings.
• Procedural flexibility through the possibility to choose a different sequence of procedural steps, moving some to before the adoption of the SO.

The Settlements Notice sets out the specifics of the new procedure and provides guidance for the legal and business community. Companies will be able to:

• anticipate the type and extent of cooperation expected from them in order to settle and
• estimate the individual benefits of settling.